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Abstract— Some electric power markets allow bidders to
specify constraints on ramp rates for increasing or decreasing
power production. We show in a small example that a bidder
could use an overly restrictive constraint to increase proﬁts,
and explore the cause by visualizing the feasible region from
the linear program corresponding to the power auction. We
propose two penalty approaches to discourage bidders from
such a tactic: one based on duality theory of Linear Pro-
gramming, the other based on social cost differences caused
by ramp constraints. We evaluate the two approaches using a
simpliﬁed scaled model of the California power system, with
actual 2001 California demand data.
Index Terms— Auction Design, Ramp constraints, Power
generation dispatch
I. INTRODUCTION
M
ANY restructured electricity systems rely on self-
commitment of generation resources rather than on
central unit commitment. This structure avoids some of
the incentive-compatibility problems associated with more
centralized systems such as the original UK system (prior
to NETA), PJM, NYPP, New England pools which in-
volve multi-dimensional auctions allowing bidders to spec-
ify technical constraints on the dispatch. Such auction,
are often susceptible to manipulation allowing bidders the
opportunity to proﬁt by specifying deceiving technical
constraints. Unfortunately, in systems that rely on self-
commitment andclear the hourly dayahead market without
considerationofintertemporalconstraintsondispatch, mis-
matches between the ISO schedule and the capabilities of
generators must be made up in the real-time balancing mar-
ket. Not only is this an expensive solution, it shifts a per-
haps unnecessary volume of energy transactions to the real
time balancing market. Furthermore, although some gener-
ation technologies hinder efﬁcient scheduling due to their
ramp constraints, and others assist with their rapid ramp-
ing capabilities, the rapid-ramping plants are not rewarded
for the ﬂexibility they bring to the system. In this paper
we explore ways to allow bidders to specify ramp rate con-
straints while mitigating to some extent the possibilities for
deceptive bidding. We are concerned with two effects of
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such bidding: an increase in overall cost, and inequity of
outcomes.
We deal here with a day-ahead energy market without
network considerations, and allow bidders to specify ramp
rate constraints as part of their offers. The decision to turn
a unit on is still left to the generator who will need to ab-
sorb the startup cost and can ensure it minimum generation
level using zero or negative offer prices for that amount. In
order to accommodate ramp constraints, the market opera-
tor would need to clear the markets for all the 24 hours si-
multaneously using an optimization algorithm. This prob-
lem, fortunately, is far less complicated than a unit com-
mitment problem since it does not introduce discrete vari-
ables into the problem. If the objective is to minimize the
social cost of the dispatch, then the market clearing prob-
lem with ramp constraints can be formulated as a Linear
Programming (LP) problem and solved by standard algo-
rithms and software. The solution gets more complex if the
objective is to minimize total procurement cost, since that
criterion introduces nonconvexities. It should be noted that
the day-ahead electricity auction in the Spanish system al-
lows bidders to specify ramp constraints as well as a ﬂoor
on their total 24-hour revenue, which are incorporated into
the market clearing formulation and solved using a heuris-
tic algorithm [1].
One simple strategy for designing the auction to avoid
manipulation is to allow ramp-rate constraints to change
only once a month, or some other suitable time interval,
since generator technologies do not change very rapidly.
While this has little theoretical backing, its practical effect
would hopefully be to prevent generators from rapidly re-
sponding to market conditions with false ramp rates, leav-
ing them with little choice but to report their true ramp
rate constraints. However, it would also allow a company
to lock in a misleading constraint and proﬁt from it for a
whole month. Another simple idea is to have a regula-
tory agency certify ramp rates, as the California regulations
stated; however, this leads to only an upper bound on the
rates. Bidders might be bidding into various markets, and
so would need to split their ramp rates among them, giving
them a valid reason to specify ramp rates lower than their
certiﬁed values.TABLE I
PROBLEM DATA
Off-peak Peak
Demand 1 GW 3 GW
Gen. A offers 1 GW, $10/MWh 1 GW, $10/MWh
Gen. B offers 2 GW, $15/MWh 2 GW, $15/MWh
Gen. C offers 2 GW, $25/MWh 2 GW, $25/MWh
The problem data given in Table I help demonstrate the
incentive compatibility problem that can arise when ramp
rates can be speciﬁed and are accounted for in the dispatch
but the spot market prices for energy are based on snap
shot market clearing that does not account for intertempo-
ral constraints affecting the dispatch. For illustrative pur-
poses we will assume that each time period has a duration
of 12 hours. Table II summarizes the auction results (for
minimizing social cost) in the absence of ramp constraints.
Suppose now that Generator B speciﬁes an intertempo-
ral constraint requiring that his dispatch level at Peak is no
greater than his dispatch level at Off-peak. Then the auc-
tion results under optimal social-cost dispatch are as given
in Table III. We note that the intertemporal constraint stip-
ulated by Generator B caused an increase in social cost due
to displacement of cheap energy with more expensive en-
ergy, while the resulting increase in market clearing prices
increased the net proﬁts of both generators A and B. While
onecouldnotfaultGeneratorAforenjoyingthewindfall, it
is clearly inappropriate for Generator B to reap extra prof-
its by stipulating a constraint that impedes efﬁciency. Such
a proﬁt opportunity could motivate generators to misrep-
resent their ramping capability in order to drive up prices.
Some market designs (e.g. the old UK system) attempt to
prevent misrepresentation of constraint by barring a con-
strained generator from setting the clearing price. Our ex-
ample demonstrates, however, that such a restriction still
does not solve the problem since the constrained genera-
tor may force a more expansive unit into the dispatch and
beneﬁt from the higher clearing price set by that unit. The
Spanish market design eliminates such perverse incentives
by forcing generators to bear the dispatch consequences of
theirrampconstraints, whichinourexamplewouldamount
to forcing Generator B out. This rule solves the incen-
tives problem but unfortunately, it may also unnecessarily
increase the social cost of the dispatch.
II. VISUALIZATION
We wish to visualize the feasible region and optimal so-
lution for our small example, to learn how Generator B can
proﬁt by specifying a ramp constraint. Our small example
has 6 variables (one for each generator in each period) and
TABLE II
AUCTION RESULTS WITHOUT RAMP CONSTRAINTS
Off-peak Peak
Clearing Price $10/MWh $15/MWh
Gen. A 1 GW 1 GW
Gen. B 0 2 GW
Gen. C 0 0
TABLE III
AUCTION RESULTS WITH GEN. B RAMP CONSTRAINT
Off-peak Peak
Clearing Price $10/MWh $15/MWh
Gen. A 0 GW 1 GW
Gen. B 1 1 GW
Gen. C 0 1 GW
2 equality constraints (one for demand in each period). Us-
ing the equality constraints we can eliminate two variables.
Furthermore, Generator A is always assigned 1 GW during
Peak regardless of us including or excluding Generator B’s
ramp constraint, so we can treat Generator A during Peak
as a ﬁxed quantity rather than as a variable. This reduces
us to 3 variables, which are more easily visualized than our
original 6. Fig. 1 shows the feasible region without Gen-
erator B’s ramp constraint; it is a triangular prism, and the
optimal solution is marked with an extra circle. We start
imposing the ramp constraint gradually in Fig. 2, where the
increase from Off-peak to Peak must be under 1.5 GW for
Generator B. We see that the new constraint plane has cut
off two corners of the non-ramp-constrained region, push-
ing the optimal solution so Generator B gets more business
during Off-peak, and Generator A gets less. Also, we must
now take Generator C’s higher price. Fig. 3 shows the fea-
sible region (an irregular tetrahedron) once the full ramp
constraint that B speciﬁed has been imposed; Generator
A has been pushed out of the Off-peak solution entirely.
TABLE IV
FINANCIAL SUMMARY
Unconstrained Ramp-Constrained
Gen. A proﬁt $60000 $180000
Gen. B proﬁt 0 $120000
Gen. C proﬁt 0 0
Social Cost $600000 $780000
Acquisition Cost $660000 $1080000Overall, we see the problem with allowing bidders to spec-
ify ramp constraints: it allows them to specify slanted con-
straint planes (as opposed to upper-bound constraints on
power output, which are orthogonal to the axes and cannot
push the solution away from other bidders).
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Fig. 1. Feasible Region without ramp constraints
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Fig. 2. Feasible Region with Generator B increase limited to 1.5 GW
When the feasible region is viewed this way (especially
as in Fig. 2), it is natural to think of the effects of the ramp-
rate constraint in terms of LP sensitivity theory. We will
explore this idea further in the next section.
III. PENALTY SYSTEMS
If we are to allow bidders to specify ramp constraints,
we should ensure that our ﬁnal dispatch satisﬁes all of the
constraints, since we do not know which are true and which
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Fig. 3. Feasible Region with full Generator B ramp constraint
are misleading. That is, in trying to make our auction more
incentive-compatible, we have little leeway in the dispatch.
We do have some room to adjust the payments, though.
One option, explored in [2], is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) auction. A VCG auction effectively pays compa-
nies to bid truthfully. It pays each offer the generation
cost based on the revealed parameter and an additional pre-
mium that reﬂect the contribution of the offer to social wel-
fare i.e., the difference in the optimal value of the objective
function with and without the offer. While the VCG auc-
tionisincentivecompatibleandefﬁcient, itmayleadtorev-
enue insufﬁciency, and is considered undesirable due to its
radical departure from the uniform price philosophy under-
lying commodity markets. Instead, we propose to capture
the essence of the VCG approach by starting with the usual
uniform (market-clearing) payments as the benchmark and
impose ﬁnancial penalties on companies whose ramp con-
straints are active at the optimal solution. This would tend
to reduce the acquisition costs, instead of increasing them
as the VCG auction does. The following are desirable fea-
tures of penalty systems:
1) Avoid under-penalizing:
• reduce the incentive to specify misleading con-
straints
• recover the increase in social cost from ramp
constraints
2) Avoid over-penalizing:
• more than the corresponding proﬁt increase
• more than the corresponding social cost increase
• so much that a bidder’s costs are not recovered
3) Quickly computable
4) Transparent
5) Unaffected by multiple optimal dispatch solutions
To these ends, we offer two penalty system proposals:1) A penalty based on LP sensitivity theory (dual vari-
ables and right-hand-side (RHS) ranges)
2) A penalty based on re-optimizing without each bid-
der’s ramp constraints in turn.
These systems are focused on the problem of the increased
social cost; they do not directly address the potential proﬁt
increase, though we will investigate their effects on this.
A. Duality-Based Penalties
The ﬁrst option calculates penalties as follows: the full
auction LP is solved, and dual variables for each active
ramp rate constraint are calculated the usual way. Also, it is
simple to extract for each ramp constraint a range in which
the RHS can vary without changing the optimal LP basis.
If a particular active ramp constraint has dual variable λ
and allowable RHS change δ, we propose that a ﬁnancial
penalty of λ · δ be imposed on the company that speciﬁed
the ramp constraint. In our example above, the dual vari-
able for Generator B’s ramp constraint is 120 $/MW, and
theallowableRHSrangeis1GW,forapenaltyof$120000.
This reduced B’s income from $480000 to $360000, ex-
actly its value in the solution without the ramp constraint.
In this case, Generator B has no incentive to specify a mis-
leading ramp constraint, unless it is in league with Gener-
ator A (who beneﬁts from B’s ramp constraint and escapes
any penalty payments).
Unfortunately, it is not hard to ﬁnd examples where the
penalty does not exactly compensate for the shifted prof-
its. In a few cases, the penalty is too much; this tends to
happen when the ramp constraint would be violated in only
one period, but after adding the constraint for all periods
(as it natural) there are two periods where it is binding,
so penalties are charged for both periods. In other cases,
the penalty is not enough, so that a company still proﬁts
by giving a misleading ramp constraint. This can happen
when the ramp constraint chops off too many corners from
the feasible region. That is, our penalty system is based on
the idea of Fig. 2, where the ramp-constrained optimum is
adjacent to the optimum without the ramp constraints. It is
this adjacency that determines how large the RHS-ranges
are. It is a matter of coincidence in the costs that this ex-
ample works well even with the full ramp constraint, where
the ramp-constrained optimum is not adjacent to the orig-
inal optimum. To avoid this situation, we consider next
dropping each bidder’s ramp constraints in turn.
B. Cost-Difference Penalties
In this penalty system, we run the auction with all ramp
constraints, and save that solution. For each bidder with
active ramp constraints, we re-optimize having relaxed its
ramp constraints. The difference in social cost between the
two solutions is the penalty to the bidder. We use the social
cost difference, rather than the acquisition cost difference,
because social cost (as revealed by the offers) reﬂects the
true cost of constraints and furthermore, the duality-based
penalties are also based on social cost. Also, since our op-
timization minimizes the social cost, alternate optimal so-
lutions can cause larger differences in the acquisition cost
than bidders should be penalized for. This approach re-
quires as many optimizations as there are bidders with ac-
tive ramp constraints. However, each optimization starts
with an easy known feasible point (the optimal solution
with all ramp constraints imposed). Thus the calculation
of penalties is not as computationally intensive as premium
computation in a VCG auction, where each new optimiza-
tion(withanofferremoved)startswithoutaknownfeasible
point.
By dropping ramp constraints and re-optimizing, our
penalties are not restricted by other adjacent vertices of the
feasible region, so in most cases penalties will be at least
as large as the duality-based penalties (the exceptions be-
ing when duality-based penalties over-penalize because of
multiple active constraints). This makes the auction more
incentive-compatible. However, it is possible that a penalty
might be so large that the penalized generator will end up
with a deﬁcit. Indeed, the penalty might be even greater
than the income itself. In either of these cases, we can
assume that the penalized company would want to with-
draw it offer. We would then exclude that company and
re-optimize (the question remains whether to exclude all
such companies simultaneously, or one at a time starting
with the worst-off). Such exclusion, however, will drive
up social and acquisition costs since eliminating an offer
amounts to adding a constraint on the optimization. This
happens with the duality-based penalty as well, but not as
often, sinceduality-basedpenaltiesaretypicallysmaller. In
either case, there is a tradeoff between reducing acquisition
cost by imposing penalties, and increasing cost by forcing
out offers through excessive penalties. Another problem
might occur if an offer that is forced out by a large penalty
is needed for reliability reasons. If this happens on a con-
tinuing basis then a Reliability-Must-Run (RMR) contract
could be enacted, but it would be harder to deal with if it
happened only occasionally.
IV. RESULTS FOR CALECO, CALIFORNIA 2001
We tested our suggested penalty approaches using gen-
erator data from the CalECo system of [3], [4] which rep-
resents a scaled abstraction of the California power system
developed for the purpose of evaluating production simula-
tion models. The details of the CalEco system are provided
in the cited references and will be omitted here due to space
limitation. The demand data, for 330 days of 2001, was
collected from the California ISO web site by Matt Schnei-
der. Because the maximum output of the CalECo genera-tors (12500 MW total) is not on the same scale as the cur-
rent California demand data, we scaled the demand data to
create three data sets in which the scaled annual peak load
(originally 41244 MW, on August 7 at 4pm) left reserves
of 1.5 %, 5%, and 15%. To isolate the effects of the ramp
constraint mechanisms, we assumed that no bidders spec-
iﬁed ramp constraints except for the “gas3” bidder, who
speciﬁed a ramp constraint of either 150 MW/hour or 200
MW/hour (2.5 or 3.33 MW/minute), which is clearly more
restrictive than a real gas-fueled generator would face. This
constraint was imposed for every hour of every day.
For each day in each data set, the following was
done:
1) Optimize social cost without any ramp constraints
2) Optimize social cost with all ramp constraints
3) Compute duality-based penalties
4) Compute cost-difference penalties
In all cases, the nuclear, QF, and coal bidders were run at
full capacity in every period, so ramp constraints for them
would have been irrelevant.
To get a feeling for the data set, Fig. 4 shows the so-
cial cost throughout the year for one of the three demand
levels, with no ramp constraints imposed (the other two
demand levels look almost the same, except for scaling).
Notice that, due to the scaled demand, the ﬁnancial ﬁg-
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Fig. 4. Daily social cost for one demand scenario
ures are much smaller than one would expect in reality.
For this reason, we will focus our evaluation on percentage
rather than absolute changes. In Fig. 5 we show the per-
cent that proﬁt for “gas3” increased when that bidder spec-
iﬁed a ramp constraint. This ﬁgure is broken out into cat-
egories by demand level and ramp constraint value (150 or
200 MW/hour). The higher percentage increases tended to
be on days without much original proﬁt, though. Tables V
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Fig. 5. Daily proﬁt increase (in percent) from no-constraint to con-
strained
TABLE V
PERCENT OF DAYS WITH INCREASED PROFITS
Reserve 150 MW/hr 200 MW/hr
1.5 % 75% 53%
5 % 63% 38%
15 % 28% 16%
and VI summarize Fig. 5, showing the percent of days with
a proﬁt increase and the the average percentage increases
for these days (weighted by proﬁt amounts). We focus only
on the days with an increase because a bidder that uses this
scheme would try to carefully choose when to specify the
constraint, so as to avoid days on which specifying a ramp
constraint would result in reduced proﬁt
Up to this point, we have described the effects of mis-
leading ramp constraints. Now we turn to the effects of the
proposed penalty schemes. Fig. 6 shows, in percentages,
the net proﬁt increases for the various scenarios, plotted
against the gross increases, with penalties calculated from
the LP dual. Fig. 7 similarly shows the results from the
cost-based penalties. Ideally, these graphs would be scat-
TABLE VI
PERCENT PROFIT INCREASE (WHEN POSITIVE)
Reserve 150 MW/hr 200 MW/hr
1.5 % 0.45 % 0.45%
5 % 0.66 % 0.71%
15 % 0.76 % 0.67%tered along a horizontal line through zero. Unfortunately,
we see that this is not the case. Also, there are days where
the gross increase is negative, and then a further penalty is
applied. This is acceptable to the extent that our aim is to
recover increases in social cost due to ramp constraints.
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Fig. 8 shows, for duality-based penalties, the percentage
of the increase in social cost that the penalties recovered,
as the year goes on. We would hope that the values would
concentrate around 100 percent. For the cost-based penal-
ties, the amount recovered is always exactly 100 percent,
when only one bidder speciﬁes a ramp constraint. It is not
clear that this would be true when more than one bidder has
an active ramp constraint; the amount recovered might be
less than or greater than the total social cost difference.
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V. VARIATIONS ON SPAIN’S SYSTEM
Spain’s electricity market rules favor a heuristic solution
procedure, rather than a process based on mathematical
programming. The market rules for Spain’s system include
the following restriction [5, pg. 28]:
In any case, when the owner of a production unit
which includes the rising/start-up or descend-
ing/stop load gradient condition in an electric
power sale offer, the market operator shall assign
the producer a lower quantity of power than the
latter would have received if it had not included
the cited condition.
This prevents a company from gaining business by specify-
ing ramp constraints, which is our aim, without specifying
penalty payments. Inspired by this rule, we consider some
variations: when a ramp constraint is speciﬁed, the con-
strained dispatch must be compared to the unconstrained
dispatch in one of these four ways:
1) The power quantity cannot increase in any hour, or
2) The sum of power dispatches over the day (i.e., en-
ergy dispatch) cannot increase, or
3) The income cannot increase in any hour, or
4) The total income for the day cannot increase.
The ﬁrst two are fairly easy to implement as simple lin-
ear constraints once the initial dispatch (without ramp con-
straints) is obtained. The ﬁrst becomes a set of 24 con-
straints, and the second becomes a single constraint. Thethird and fourth variations are much harder to implement,
since the income in any period is the product of the market-
clearing price and the dispatch quantity, and so is a nonlin-
ear term. Furthermore, we have to add binary variables to
the LP formulation to calculate the market-clearing price
in this context. It is possible to eliminate the nonlinearity
by noting that the market-clearing price must come from
the set of offers, and creating a constraint for each com-
bination of possibilities, but this becomes unwieldy very
quickly. Overall, fromthemarketperspective(ignoringim-
plementation difﬁculties) it seems that restrictions on the
total daily income make more sense than hourly incomes,
due to cost differences between hours of the day. Also,
income constraints seem better than MW allocation con-
straints, since the bottom line is proﬁt rather than power
generation (although in Spain power generation may have
an indirect effect on proﬁt due to stranded cost payments.)
While any of these four approaches sound fair, there are
two other predicaments that should be considered: they can
make the problem infeasible, and they depend heavily on
the initial solution. Electric power dispatch problems are
notorious for having multiple optimal solutions. If the so-
lution chosen as the initial one gives a particular company
onlyasmallallocation(ofpower, energy, orincome), while
another solution gives it a larger share, it seems unfair to re-
strict that company to the smaller of the two. To avoid this
problem, though, we might have to optimize once for each
company, trying to give it as big an allocation as possible
while maintaining (near-) optimality. This would signiﬁ-
cantly increase the computational requirements of the auc-
tion process.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The duality-based penalties have the advantage of being
easily computed from a single run of the auction LP, along
withhavingtheusualeconomicinterpretationsofdualvari-
ables. However, we have seen that they are not particu-
larly effective in recovering social cost losses from genera-
tors due to strategic speciﬁcation of ramp constraints. The
cost-based penalties require many optimizations to be run,
but they perform better on social cost recovery. Neither
penalty system performs very well at removing the incen-
tive for any particular bidder to specify misleading ramp
constraints. The variations proposed for the Spanish ap-
proach are all subject to the problem of multiple optimal
solutions, and the two that make the most sense ﬁnancially
are the most difﬁcult to implement. Further research is
needed into the problem of incentive-compatible auctions
with ramp constraints. However, at this point it seems that
in order to prevent gaming generators should be restricted
in how often they can restate such constraints.
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